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FIFTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS-THE
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MULTIPLE
CHARGE ARRAIGNMENTS
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 111 S. Ct. 2204 (1991)
I. INTRODUCTION
In McNeil v. Wisconsin I the Supreme Court held that a suspect's
invocation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at an arraign-
ment on one charge does not imply invocation of the Fifth Amend-
ment right to counsel at an interrogation concerning a separate
crime. The majority, arguing that the Sixth Amendment application
is offense-specific, based its decision on the fact that the two of-
fenses were unrelated. 2 The majority also found no evidence that
McNeil had ever invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel in
the context of either offenseY
The dissent argued that the offense-specific application of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel was inconsistent with the ordi-
nary understanding of the scope of the right4 and inconsistent with
Michigan v. Jackson.5
This Note examines the application of the Miranda-Edwards doc-
trine in the context of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to
counsel. This Note argues that the McNeil majority correctly distin-
guished the bases for applying the Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights to counsel and refused to allow invocation of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel to imply invocation of the Fifth
Amendment right such that future waiver of the Fifth Amendment
right would be invalid.
By declining to extend the Miranda-Edwards doctrine, the Court
correctly balanced society's valid need to prosecute criminals with
the concern for the protection of individual rights.
I 111 S. Ct. 2204 (1991).
2 Id. at 2207.
3 Id. at 2209.
4 Id. at 2212 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
5 See Michigan v.Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986). TheJackson Court held that invoca-
tion of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at an arraignment barred later uncounsel-
led interrogation of the suspect when the same offense was the subject of both the
arraignment and the interrogation.
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II. IISTORY OF THE MIRANDA-EDWARDS DOCTRINE
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states
that "[n]o person shall be ... compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.. . ." In Miranda v. Arizona 6 the Court estab-
lished the prophylactic rule that before custodial interrogation be-
gins, police must advise a suspect of his right to remain silent and
his right to have counsel.7 Police must cease interrogation if the
suspect in custody "indicates in any manner and at any stage of the
process that he wished to consult with an attorney before speak-
ing."" The Court recognized that the right to counsel is an impor-
tant safeguard of the individual's will to resist the compelling nature
of in-custody interrogation, without which "no statement obtained
from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice."9
The Court confirmed the importance of safeguarding the indi-
vidual's right to counsel in Edwards v. Arizona.10 The Edwards Court
held that once a suspect has clearly invoked his Fifth Amendment
right to counsel at an interrogation, police may not initiate further
interrogation without the presence of counsel.1 The fact that the
suspect responds to police-initiated questions does not constitute a
valid waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights. 12 The suspect invoked
his Fifth Amendment right to counsel with regard to the same crime
to which he later confessed.
13
The Court extended the Edwards doctrine in Michigan v. Jack-
son 14 to invalidate a subsequent waiver of the Fifth Amendment
right to counsel where a defendant had already invoked his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel at an arraignment on the same
charge. 15 If a defendant invokes his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel at an arraignment, his Fifth Amendment rights attach with
respect to the arraigned crime and police cannot initiate interroga-
tion without the presence of counsel.
16
Finally, in Arizona v. Roberson 17 the Court held that when a sus-
pect in continuous custody invokes his Fifth Amendment right to
6 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
7 Id. at 479.
8 Id. at 444-455.
9 Id. at 458.
10 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
1 Id. at 484-85.
12 Id. at 484.
13 Id. at 487.
14 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
15 Id. at 636.
16 Id. at 632.
17 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
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counsel during interrogation on one offense, police may not re-initi-
ate questioning without the presence of counsel even if the subject
of that questioning is a separate offense."'
Thus, once specifically invoked, the Fifth Amendment right to
counsel shields a suspect and invalidates his waiver of that right
even with respect to a different offense when custody is continuous
(Roberson rule). In addition, a suspect who has invoked his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is protected from police-initiated ques-
tioning on that offense without counsel even though that suspect
has not specifically requested counsel in the Fifth Amendment con-
text (Edwards rule).
The McNeil Court addressed the issue of whether the invocation
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel triggers the application of
the Edwards rule relative to a separate offense.
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Wisconsin authorities suspected Paul McNeil of armed robbery
in Milwaukee County and of involvment in an unrelated robbery and
homicide in Racine County, Wisconsin. 19 On May 21, 1987, two
Milwaukee County deputies escorted McNeil from Omaha, Ne-
braska, where he was in custody, back to Milwaukee, where he faced
the Milwaukee County armed robbery charge. 20 The deputies ad-
vised McNeil of his Miranda rights. 21 McNeil refused to answer
questions, but did not request counsel at that time.
22
Detective Smulkowski of Milwaukee County, one of the detec-
tives escorting McNeil, was aware that McNeil was a suspect in the
Racine County homicide as well as the Milwaukee county robbery. 23
While transporting McNeil back to Milwaukee, the two deputies
talked to McNeil about both crimes. 24 Detective Smulkowski urged
McNeil to "tell his side of the story" so that his cooperation might
help his cause later.25 Prior to leaving Omaha, the two Milwaukee
County detectives used McNeil's help in an unsuccessful search for a
suspected accomplice in the Racine County homicide.26
The following day, McNeil appeared before a Milwaukee
18 Id. at 687-88.
19 State v. McNeil, 454 N.W.2d 742 (Wis. 1990).
20 Id.
21 McNeil v. Wisconsin, 111 S. Ct. 2204, 2206 (1990).
22 Id.
23 Id. at 2213, n.1 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
24 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
25 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
26 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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County court commissioner on the armed robbery charge. 27 An at-
torney from the public defender's office represented McNeil at this
initial appearance.
28
Later that evening, Detective Joseph Butts of the Milwaukee
County Sheriff's Department, who had been assisting the Racine
County authorities in the homicide investigation, visited McNeil in
jail.29 Butts advised McNeil of his Miranda rights and McNeil signed
a waiver form.30 While McNeil did not deny knowledge of the Ra-
cine County homicide, he claimed he was not involved.
3'
On May 24, Detective Butts returned with detectives from Ra-
cine County.32 Butts advised McNeil of his Miranda rights and Mc-
Neil initialled the waiver form.33 McNeil admitted his involvement
in the Racine County crimes and implicated two other men, Pope
and Crowley.34 Detective Butts and the Racine County authorities
returned again on May 26, gave McNeil the Miranda warning and
obtained his waiver.35 In this interview, McNeil said that he had lied
about Pope's involvement to minimize his own culpability and Mc-
Neil confessed to the crime.3
6
On May 27, McNeil was formally charged with the Racine
County crimes and the Milwaukee authorities transferred him to
that jurisdiction. 37 The trial court denied his pre-trial motion to
suppress the three incriminating statements concerning the Racine
County offense. 38 He was convicted and sentenced to sixty years in
prison for second-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder
and armed robbery.
39
McNeil appealed the conviction.40 He contended that his court
appearance in connection with the Milwaukee County robbery
charge wherein he was represented by counsel constituted an invo-
cation of his Miranda right to counsel.4 ' He further argued that
"subsequent waiver of that right during police initiated questioning
27 State v. McNeil, 454 N.W.2d 742, 744 (Wis. 1990).





33 Id. at 2206-07.










regarding any offense was invalid."'42 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court refused to suppress the confessions and agreed with the trial
court that McNeil's appearance with counsel on a charged offense
did not constitute invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to coun-
sel that precludes custodial interrogation on an unrelated, un-
charged offense.
43
IV. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
According to Justice Scalia, the Court granted certiorari in or-
der to decide whether invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel implied the invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to
counsel relative to a separate offense.4 4 Justice Scalia cited Michigan
v. Jackson, in which the Court held that once the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel had been invoked, "any subsequent waiver during
police-initiated custodial interview is ineffective. ' 45 While acknowl-
edging that McNeil's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had at-
tached at the time McNeil made the incriminating statements,
Justice Scalia described that right as offense-specific and therefore
operative only for the Milwaukee County offense. 46 "It cannot be
invoked once for all future prosecutions, for it does not attach until
the prosecution is commenced," 47 meaning at or after the formal
adversarial process has begun, through a "formal charge, prelimi-
nary hearing, indictment, information or arraignment." 48 Since the
right is offense-specific, the Jackson rule which invalidates subse-
quent waivers in police-initiated interrogations can only operate
with regard to the offense for which the right to counsel has been
claimed. 49
Justice Scalia said that it was contrary to the public's interest in
prosecuting crimes to exclude evidence relative to charges to which
the Sixth Amendment has not yet attached. 50 Justice Scalia pointed
out that at the time McNeil made the incriminating statements, he
had not been formally charged with the Racine County crimes. 5 1
42 Id. (emphasis in original).
43 State v. McNeil, 454 N.W.2d 742, 746 (Wis. 1990).
44 McNeil, 111 S. Ct. at 2207.
45 Id. (citing Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986)).
46 Id. at 2207.
47 Id.
48 Id. (quoting United States V. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984) quoting Kirby v.
Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (plurality opinion)).
49 Id.
50 Id. at 2207-08 (citing Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 179-80 (1985)).
5t Id. at 2208.
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McNeil therefore could not and did not invoke his Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel relative to the Racine County offenses.52 On
that basis, the majority held that McNeil's statements were
admissible. 53
Justice Scalia then examined McNeil's Miranda-based claim.
The Miranda doctrine provides that the Fifth Amendment protec-
tion against self-incrimination guarantees one the right to counsel.
54
To counter the compelling nature of custodial interrogation, the Mi-
randa Court developed prophylactic measures to ensure that an ac-
cused was aware of his rights, including the right to counsel. 55
Justice Scalia emphasized, however, that one can waive those rights,
and that with a valid waiver in place, self-incriminating statements
could be admissible.
56
Justice Scalia went on to review the holding in Edwards v. Ari-
zona, that once a suspect in custody asserts his right to counsel, no
further interrogation is permitted until counsel is provided for the
suspect 57 and is present at the interrogation.58 The Edwards rule "is
not offense-specific." 59 If a suspect invokes his Miranda right to
counsel relative to one offense, all further police-initiated interroga-
tion is barred "regarding any offense until counsel is present." 60
Justice Scalia disagreed with McNeil's contention because of the
differences between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to coun-
sel.6 1 McNeil waived his Miranda rights, but claimed those waivers
were invalid because of his earlier invocation of his Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel with respect to the Milwaukee burglary. 62
This asserted right, McNeil claimed, was also an invocation of the
non-offense specific Miranda-Edwards right.63 The Court found Mc-
Neil's claim false because the purpose of the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel is to protect the suspect "after 'the adverse positions of
government and defendant have solidified' with respect to a particu-
lar alleged crime."64 In contrast, the Miranda-Edwards rule is
52 Id
53 Id.
54 Id. (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
55 Id.
56 Id. (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966)).
57 Id. (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 447, 484-485 (1981)).
58 Id (citing Minnick V. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 486 (1990)).
59 Id. (citing Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988) (emphasis in original)).








designed to protect a "suspect's desires 'to deal with police only
through counsel'" during custodial interrogation 65 "regarding any
suspected crime."
66
While the majority acknowledged that it is likely that a suspect
who has requested counsel in one proceeding would want counsel
present during custodial interrogation on another charge, "the like-
lihood that a suspect would wish counsel present is not the test for
applicability of Edwards.' ' 67 The Edwards rule applies only when a
suspect has expressly made some statement which could reasonably
be interpreted as a desire for counsel during custodial interroga-
tion. 68 According to justice Scalia, requesting counsel at a bail hear-
ing does not trigger the Edwards rule because to hold that a
defendant has invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel on one
charge "merely by requesting the appointment of counsel on the
unrelated charge is to disregard the ordinary meaning of the
request." 6
9
The majority cited Michigan v. Jackson to bolster the argument
that the invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not
the functional equivalent of the trigger for the Miranda-Edwards
rule.70 The Jackson Court held that invocation of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel precludes the police from obtaining any later
statements during police-initiated interrogation relative to that
same charge even if the suspect waives his right to counsel at that
interrogation. 71 InJackson, the Court held that "the relevant ques-
tion was not whether the Miranda 'Fifth Amendment' right had been
asserted, but whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had
been waived." 72 If the two rights were functionally equivalent, the
majority argued, there would have been no need for the Jackson
Court to develop a new Sixth Amendment rule precluding police
initiated interrogation for they could have simply relied on
Edwards.73
Justice Scalia rejected the notion that even if invocation of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not in fact imply the invoca-
tion of the Miranda Fifth Amendment right, the Court had a duty to
65 Id. (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981)).
66 Id. (emphasis in original).
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. (quoting State v. Stewart, 780 P.2d 844, 849 (Wash. 1989) cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1327 (1990)).
70 Id. at 2209-10.
71 Id. (citing Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 632-33 (1986)).
72 Id. (citing Jackson, 475 U.S. at 633) (emphasis in original).
73 Id. at 2210.
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declare it so as a matter of policy.74 Weighing the costs and benefits
of such a rule, the Court found that there would be little advantage
for the accused, for if a suspect does not want to deal with the police
without an attorney present, the suspect can tell that to the police
when the Miranda warning is given.7 5 Because the accused is being
questioned on a charge other than the one for which he had re-
quested counsel, the majority concluded that "[t]here is not the re-
motest chance that [the accused] will feel 'badgered' by [the police]
asking to talk to him without counsel present.
76
On the other hand, Justice Scalia was concerned that adopting
such a rule would mean that the authorities would be prohibited
from approaching persons in pretrial custody and questioning them
relative to other crimes "even though they have never expressed any unwill-
ingness to be questioned."77 Justice Scalia concluded that this would be
detrimental to society's interest in catching and punishing
criminals.
78
Finally, the Court dispelled the notion that a bright-line rule is
required in this case. While acknowledging that it is the Court's task
to create such rules, they will only do so "when they guide sensi-
bly." 79 In declining to add yet another rule to Miranda, the Court
stated that Miranda and its progeny are like "new stories [being ad-
ded] to the temples of constitutional law, and temples have a way of
collapsing when one story too many is added." 80
B. CONCURRING OPINION
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy emphasized that the cur-
rent line of rules stemming from Edwards is more than adequate to
protect a suspect who desires counsel during custodial interroga-
tion.8 1 Justice Kennedy advocated that since the Court has adopted
an offense-specific rule for the invocation of the Sixth Amendment,
the Court should align its Fifth and Sixth Amendment rulings so as
to provide "uniform, fair and workable guidelines for the criminal
justice system." 82




77 Id. (emphasis in original).
78 Id (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986)).
79 Id. at 2211.
80 Id. (quoting Douglas v.Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 181 (1943) (opinion ofJackson,J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part)).
81 Id. (Kennedy, J. concurring).
82 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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ity and held that even if McNeil had invoked his Fifth Amendment
right to counsel relative to the Milwaukee County robbery, (which
according to the majority would have rendered McNeil's later waiv-
ers invalid per Roberson 83), the police should have been allowed to
question him without counsel regarding the Racine County homi-
cide.8 4 This, in effect, would overrule Roberson.
C. THE DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall and Justice Black-
mun, dissented, objecting to the majority view as demeaning the im-
portance of the right to counsel.8 5 Justice Stevens focused on the
distinction between the practical and theoretical impact of the " 'of-
fense-specific' limitation on the attorney-client relationship. ' '8 6 He
concluded that the practical impact would be slight because attor-
neys would simply advise their clients at preliminary hearing to
make a statement invoking their Fifth Amendment rights.8 7 Accord-
ing to Justice Stevens, the theoretical implications are ominous, be-
cause this decision "reflects a preference for an inquisitorial system
that regards the defense lawyer as an impediment rather than a ser-
vant of justice."
'8
Justice Stevens derided the majority's reliance on offense-speci-
ficity as a "house of cards" which would collapse under the rule in
Arizona v. Roberson, wherein a suspect in custodial interrogation, who
invokes his right to counsel relative to one crime may not be reap-
proached by authorities regarding any crime unless counsel is pres-
ent.8 9 In the future, effective counsel will make sure there is a
statement on the record at the initial proceeding which will preclude
further interrogation in the absence of counsel.90
Justice Stevens viewed the offense-specific description of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel as "parsimonious"''" and incon-
sistent with both legal precedent and with "the ordinary under-
standing of the scope of the right" and its accepted practice.
92
Justice Stevens argued that the invocation of a suspect's right to
counsel at an arraignment precludes police-initiated custodial inter-
83 Id. at 2208 (citing Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988)).
84 Id. at 2211 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
85 Id. at 2212 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86 Id. (Stevens, J. dissenting).
87 Id. (Stevens, J. dissenting).
88 Id. (Stevens, J. dissenting).
89 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988)).
90 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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rogation after the arraignment without notice to the suspect's attor-
ney.9 3 A long line of precedent requires that the Court give a
"broad rather than a narrow interpretation of the defendant's re-
quest for counsel."9 4 Justice Stevens viewed the majority opinion as
constricting that interpretation and, contrary to Jackson, presuming
waiver where the suspect's request for counsel in ambiguous.
95
Justice Stevens argued that the majority view was in conflict
with the common sense notion of the right to counsel expressed in
Jackson.96 CitingJackson, Justice Stevens noted that the average per-
son does not understand the "subtle distinctions" between the Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel. 97 When a suspect requests
counsel, he should not have to explain which constitutional provi-
sion is the basis for his request, nor why he is seeking counsel.
98
Justice Stevens noted the irony that this decision creates - a sus-
pect who asks a police officer for an attorney is relieved of further
interrogation, while a suspect making that same request of a magis-
trate is not.99 He further argued that the very fact that a suspect
requests counsel indicates he does not feel capable of dealing with
the police without representation. 100
Justice Stevens criticized the Court's reasoning that because the
Milwaukee County and Racine County crimes were separate of-
fenses the invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did
not imply a request for counsel at custodial interrogation. 10 1 The
dissent argued that McNeil could not have known that invocation of
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel applied only to the Milwau-
kee County crimes, since the investigations of both the Milwaukee
and Racine County crimes were "concurrent and conducted by
overlapping personnel."'
0 2
Justice Stevens saw the offense-specific description of the right
to counsel as unrealistically narrowing the attorney-client relation-
ship. 10 3 He was particularly critical of the inference that McNeil
could help his cause by discussing "his side of the story" regarding
93 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986)).
94 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citingJackson, 475 U.S. at 633).
95 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
96 Id. at 2213 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quotingJackson, 475 U.S. at 633-34 n.7)).
98 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100 Id. (Stevens, J. dissenting).
101 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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either crime with the Milwaukee County authorities. 0 4
In Justice Stevens' view, the offense-specific limitation on the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel creates confusion for the author-
ities.' 0 5 Because the Court assumed that the Milwaukee County
robbery and the Racine County homicide were unrelated crimes, the
Court failed to define the boundaries by which the police will deter-
mine whether crimes are truly separate.' 06 Justice Stevens was con-
cerned that the police will be given broad latitude to file charges
separately in order to "preserve opportunities for custodial
interrogation."
07
Finally, Justice Stevens dismissed the Court's policy concern
that suspects who have invoked the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel would be unapproachable on other crimes when they have not
expressly declined to be questioned. Justice Stevens called this fear
misguided, since rather then make suspects unapproachable, it en-
sures that the custodial suspect's statements are voluntary.'
08
Justice Stevens argued that the adversarial system functions ef-
fectively only when both sides are represented by counsel. 10 9 Lay
persons are then protected "from overreaching by more exper-
ienced and skilled professionals." ' "10 According to Justice Stevens,
by creating an inherently unfair procedure, the Court is showing a
preference for an inquisitorial system of justice. 111
Justice Stevens cited his dissent in Moran v. Burbine, noting that
the real issue is the proper role of' the attorney in our justice sys-
tem.1 2 According to Justice Stevens, in an inquisitorial society, the
lawyer is regarded as an obstacle to the authorities in their pursuit
of criminals. "13 In an adversarial society, the lawyer is a protector of
constitutional rights." 14 By failing to recognize that there is a dan-
ger of compulsion inherent in custodial interrogations such as this,
the Court, according to Justice Stevens, failed to appreciate the dif-
ference between the inquisitorial and adversarial systems." 15
Justice Stevens would have extended the Jackson rule to apply
104 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
105 Id. at 2214 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
110 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
111 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 468 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
1 13 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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where the Sixth Amendment invocation protects the suspect from
uncounselled interrogation concerning a separate offense and
would have excluded McNeil's confession as inadmissable.
V. ANALYSIS
The majority in McNeil correctly balances society's need to ob-
tain admissions of guilt with the right of the individual to choose
whether to speak to police in the absence of counsel. By holding
that the Fifth Amendment right to counsel is not implied by the in-
vocation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel on a separate
charge, the Court also maintains a critical distinction between the
two rights. The Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel may
attach at different points in the process because they function differ-
ently to protect a suspect's right to counsel, with the line being that
between evidence gathering and adjudication.' 16 McNeil is consis-
tent with precedent because at the time of the interrogation in ques-
tion the defendant's Sixth Amendment right had attached only with
respect to the Milwaukee County crime. McNeil had not been
charged with the Racine County homicide at the time he was inter-
rogated and confessed to that crime.
Admissions of guilt are "essential to society's compelling inter-
est in finding, convicting and punishing those who violate the
law."' 17 At the same time, the Court has acknowledged that custo-
dial interrogation is "inherently coercive" and there is a risk that
police will overstep their bounds to obtain confessions.",, The Mi-
randa decision "attempted to reconcile these opposing concerns by
giving the defendant the power to exert some control over the course
of the interrogation." ' "19
The fundamental purpose of the Miranda decision was to pro-
tect the suspect's right to choose between silence and speech during
questioning.' 20 Once police warn a suspect, the suspect is "free to
exercise his own volition in deciding whether or not to make a state-
ment to authorities."'1' The Court held it to be "quite consistent
with the Fifth Amendment" for police to take the opportunity pro-
vided by the suspect to obtain an oral confession.' 22 To hold that
McNeil could not waive his right to counsel at an interrogation be-
116 William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L. REv. 761 (1989).
117 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986).
118 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984).
119 Moran, 475 U.S. at 426 (emphasis in original).
120 Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 522, 528 (1986).
121 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1984).
122 Barrett, 479 U.S. at 529.
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cause he had been represented by counsel at an arraignment on a
different charge would be to deny his right to choose to speak with
the authorities in the absence of counsel.
The McNeil Court expressed the valid concern that to adopt Mc-
Neil's proposed rule would render suspects in pre-trial custody
"'unapproachable" on other crimes even though those suspects had
never expressed an unwillingness to talk to police.123 The purpose
of the Sixth Amendment is "not to wrap a protective cloak around
the attorney client relationship for its own sake any more than it is
to protect a suspect from the consequences of his own candor."'124
Prohibiting conversation with a person who is represented (even
though that representation is in the context of a different charge)
could needlessly hinder society's valid law enforcement efforts. "In-
deed, any person operating on the shady side of the law might retain
counsel on an ongoing basis and thereby insulate himself com-
pletely from any government efforts . . . to obtain oral evidence
from him." 12
5
By declining to imply invocation of the Fifth Amendment right
to counsel from application of the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel, the McNeil Court maintained an important distinction between
the nature and purpose of the two rights. The Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights to counsel stem from different sources. The
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is based on the status of the indi-
vidual as an accused and "does not depend upon a request by the
defendant." 126 It follows then that "the Sixth Amendment does not
attach until after the initiation of formal charges,"' 127 because that is
the point at which a person acquires the status of an accused. It is
not clear from the facts of McNeil that the defendant ever requested
counsel, yet he received counsel at his arraignment on the Milwau-
kee County charge.
On the other hand, invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to
counsel depends upon a claim of right and requires some expres-
sion to assert that claim. The Edwards rule applies only when the
suspect has "expressed his desire to deal with police only through
counsel"' 128 and has "clearly asserted his right to counsel."' 129
While the circuits are split as to the level of clarity required for such
123 McNeil v. Wisconsin, 111 S. Ct. 2204, 2210 (1991) (emphasis in original).
124 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 430 (1986).
125 H. Richard Uviller, Evidence from the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration of
Current Rules of Access and Restraint, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1137, 1180 (1987).
126 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977).
127 Aoran, 475 U.S. at 431.
128 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981).
129 Id. at 485.
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an assertion to trigger the Edwards rule,130 some statement is neces-
sary for a suspect to claim his Fifth Amendment right to counsel.
13 1
There is no evidence in this case that McNeil ever even ambiguously
requested counsel.
Another important distinction between the Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights to counsel is their waivability. An accused may
waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel once it has attached,
but that waiver is governed by the relatively restrictive rule of Faretta
v. California.13 2 Under Faretta, defendants can choose to waive coun-
sel and defend themselves, but only after a searching inquiry by the
trial judge, who is obliged to make sure that the defendant knows
the dangers of self-representation.1 33 In contrast, the Barrett Court,
referring to the way in which a defendant waives his Fifth Amend-
ment right to counsel, stated that the Court "has never embraced
the theory that a defendant's ignorance of the full consequences of
his decisions vitiates their voluntariness."' 3
4
The reason for the relatively greater protection of the suspect's
right to counsel in the Sixth Amendment context may lie in the dis-
tinction between the investigation and adjudication phases of the
justice process. Custodial interrogation involves obtaining evi-
dence. "Were the right to counsel vigorously protected ... [at that
stage], evidence would simply be harder to gather, a result that
harms rather than helps the innocent. On the other hand, the right
to counsel is protected in pretrial discovery and trial, where lack of
counsel might undermine innocent defendants' efforts to avoid con-
130 While the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the consequences of an
equivocal request for counsel, some courts had adopted a per se rule barring continued
interrogation after such a request. Maglio v.Jago, 580 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1978)("Maybe
I should have an attorney" barred further interogation). Other courts have ruled that
police may continue questioning a suspect to clarify the suspect's equivocal request for
counsel. United States v. Porter, 776 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1985) (suspect telephoned attor-
ney but did not reach him.); United States v. Gotay, 844 F.2d 971, 975 (2nd Cir. 1988)
(suspect stated she was "concerned about obtaining a lawyer" but police continued
questioning.); United States v. Riggs, 537 F.2d 1219 (4th Cir. 1976) (suspect's statement
that he had no information to furnish the F.B.I. could be interpreted as desire to end the
interrogation.); Thompson v. Wainright, 601 F.2d 768, 772 (5th Cir. 1979) (suspect
signed waiver and said he wanted to make a statement, but also said he wanted to talk to
an attorney.); United States v. Fouche, 833 F.2d 1284, 1287 (9th Cir. 1987) (suspect
stated he "might want to talk to a lawyer."); United States v. Gonzalez, 833 F.2d 1464
(11th Cir. 1987) (suspect said she tried to obtain counsel but found it to be too
expensive.).
131 Edwards, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
132 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
133 Stuntz, supra note 116, at 827.
134 Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 520, 530 (1986)(quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470
U.S. 298, 316 (1985)).
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viction.'135 The Court emphasized this distinction in Moran when it
stated that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel"becomes applica-
ble only when the government's role shifts from investigation to ac-
cusation."1 36 To imply invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to
counsel from the relatively unwaivable invocation of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel would be to ignore this distinction be-
tween evidence-gathering and adjudication.
The McNeil Court maintained consistency with precedent be-
cause McNeil's arraignment (where he was represented by counsel)
and his subsequent interrogation (where he waived his Fifth Amend-
ment right to counsel) involved different crimes, and McNeil had
never invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel relative to
either crime. Had the same offense been the subject of both ar-
raignment and subsequent interrogation, the Jackson 137 rule would
clearly invalidate the waiver. In McNeil, however, the Milwaukee
County robbery and the Racine County robbery-homicide were sep-
arate and distinct crimes.
If McNeil had invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel
relative to the Milwaukee County crime, the Roberson 13 8 rule would
have invalidated his later waiver. Since McNeil never invoked his
Fifth Amendment right to counsel, however, the Roberson rule did
not apply.
Justice Stevens believed that McNeil would have little practical
effect because "[imn future preliminary hearings, competent counsel
can be expected to make sure that they or their clients make a state-
ment on the record [invoking the Fifth Amendment right to coun-
sel] that will obviate the consequences of today's holding."' 39
While Justice Stevens' prediction may come true with respect to the
behavior of attorneys and their clients in future cases, the facts in
McNeil were different. McNeil never invoked his Fifth Amendment
right to counsel in the context of either crime. The Court correctly
refused to imply McNeil's claim of Fifth Amendment protection
where no claim had been made simply because a smart lawyer would
have advised making that claim.
While precedent required that the Court "give a broad, rather
than a narrow interpretation to a defendant's request for coun-
sel,"' 140 immunizing McNeil from future Miranda waiver merely be-
135 Stuntz, supra note 116, at 829.
136 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 430 (1986).
137 Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986).
138 Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
139 McNeil v. Wisconsin, 111 S. Ct. 2204, 2212 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140 Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633 (1986).
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cause he allowed an attorney to represent him at a previous
arraignment for a separate crime would be an overly-broad exten-
sion of precedent. It would weight the individual's interests too
heavily, thereby upsetting the balance between society's need to
prosecute criminals and the individual's rights to be represented by
counsel and to be free from self-incrimination.
VI. CONCLUSION
The McNeil Court addressed the rather technical issue of the
difference between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel
to demonstrate why invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel does not imply invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to
counsel. Since the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is based on a
person's status as an accused, it requires no expression for invoca-
tion. The Fifth Amendment right to counsel, however, is based on a
claim of right and therefore does require some express invocation.
Because McNeil's crimes were unrelated, and because he had never
invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel in the context of
either crime, the Court had little difficulty finding this decision con-
sistent with precedent.
In order to protect society's valid interest in prosecuting
criminals, the Court refused to immunize a suspect from future
waiver of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel simply because that
suspect had been represented by counsel at an arraignment for a
separate crime.
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